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Abstract 
This study probes the limits and possibilities of US military efforts to facilitate the 
transition from warfighting to nation-building. Most comparative studies conceive the 
complexity of this transition along a spectrum from conflict to humanitarian assistance to post-
conflict stabilization. While the last two stages have often been interpreted as a coordinated act 
of civil-military ‘nation-building’; the spectrum, in fact, represents an ideal type simplification. 
At one level, outcomes depend on the players involved, including: sovereign nations, national 
militaries, international and regional institutions, UN peacekeepers, private security contractors, 
and non-governmental humanitarian providers, among others. On the other hand, because the 
number, types, and causes of case outcomes are highly diverse and contingent upon many 
possible factors (among them for example: political, economic, military, organizational, 
humanitarian, cultural, and religious), institutions like the US military face serious difficulties 
both planning and coordinating post-conflict scenarios. Assuming this complex backdrop, the 
present study offers a qualitative analysis of two recent US government reports by the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) on US military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both 
cases, the US government sought to ‘nation-build’ by facilitating post-war stabilization and 
humanitarian assistance, detailing its genuine efforts to record both processes. While results 
indicate some limited successes in both cases, they also indicate a familiar pattern of uneven 
performance failures consistent with other cases internationally. The analysis concludes with 
recommendations for further research that may better control the contingencies of post-conflict 
management. 
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Introduction 
In the last thirty years, the international community has witnessed an exponential rise in 
conflict; inducing the diaspora of refugees across vast continents, the dislocation of millions of 
internally displaced personnel (IDPs) within warzones, the massacres and slavery of unarmed 
civilians, and the unprecedented emergence of epidemics instigated by targeted destruction of 
humanitarian efforts (Ryan 2013; The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2019; 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019). The aftermath of conflict presents a strategic window of 
opportunity for stabilization operations that is contingent upon the adaptability of involved 
humanitarian actors to the degree of security in unpredictable environments (UN General 
Assembly and Security Council 2000, 2009). Without assistance or intervention, countries can 
collapse into failed states or relapse into conflict, which in turn can exacerbate the magnitude of 
security and humanitarian fallout in the region (Lamb 2015; Logan & Peble 2011; Walter 2010). 
Such disastrous occurrences have not hampered the international response.1  
While national and international organizations, religious institutions, and private actors 
have not been indifferent to the suffering caused by so much conflict—both inter-and 
intrastate—their desire for humanitarian intervention is no match for the threats they face under 
conditions of violence where they often become targets of the various combatants involved 
(Myerson 2012; Seybolt 2012). In effect, attempting to deliver humanitarian assistance in various 
post-conflict environments often confront humanitarian actors with unprecedented security 
challenges that threaten the continuity and stability of their international operations. Not 
surprisingly as a short-term fix, they have lobbied for state or international authorities to provide 
some measure of stability in the form of military intervention meant to serve as an instrument of 
 
1 The World Bank reported a 3,700% increase in aid received since 1960 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2017). 
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transition from conflict suppression to security stabilization and finally, to post-conflict 
reconstruction – the foundational components that define nation-building (Ryan 2003).  
It is essential to recognize that there is no agreed-upon definition of nation-building, 
rather there are abstract subcomponents that have been ascertained by scholars and practitioners 
(Azimi 2019; Berger & Scowcroft 2005; Suhrke 2007). James Dobbins (2003), senior fellow and 
distinguished chair in Diplomacy and Security at the RAND Corporation, identified critical 
factors challenges that influence the level of success in nation-building into a hierarchy of seven 
essential subcomponents or tasks.2 The inherent objectives of nation-building are beyond the 
scope of the US military, even though the military has attempted to control all variables and 
subcomponents of nation-building through a top-down approach. Due to the nature of the SIGAR 
and SIGIR reports—the actual mission of the post-conflict experience in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq—this paper will only focus on the tangible post-conflict reconstruction of the development 
and infrastructure as pillars of nation-building.3 
Military to the Rescue? 
Has this approach to pacifying and reconstructing war zones been effective or justified 
the expectations of humanitarian aid organizations? Answers have been and remain diverse, 
partial, and contingent. Despite the high cost of conflict and the humanitarian impulse to 
alleviate human suffering, militaries are generally reluctant warriors in the business of 
humanitarian affairs. Despite their history of occasional mission successes, modern militaries 
 
2 There is no agreed-upon definition of nation-building with academic circles; however, the idealtype of state-building is a multifaceted, 
multilevel, and multistage process to rebuild and strengthen a state's raison d'être as a functioning state, without any restrictions on a time frame. 
Seven subcomponents of nation-building published in published by the RAND Corporation, titled The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building and 
America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq: 1) rule of law, 2) governance, 3) security, 4) humanitarian, 5) economic stabilization, 
6) democratization, and 7) development and infrastructure (Dobbins 2003, 2007). 
 
3 Post-conflict reconstruction is the rebuilding and development of security and infrastructure to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system as a whole; as a result, it contributes to the strengthening of the economy, health, security, government infrastructure, and many others 
sectors that assists in legitimizing the government institution. It is one of many components that advance the concretization of the rule of law and 
facilizations the democratization of both political and economic institutions – leading to the idea of nation-building (Kaldor & Rangelov 2014, 
pp.265-281). Thus, post-conflict reconstruction is not interchangeble with nation-building, rather it is a proccess that leads to its ultimate purpose. 
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face many obstacles that limit their effectiveness, make them unwilling participants, or worse, 
explain their failures. One can compose a laundry list of factors here that make militaries 
reluctant warriors in humanitarian missions, but they can fairly be summarized as fears stemming 
from a lack of political, institutional, and ultimately operational control over mission planning, 
logistics, and implementation, whether the source of the fear is rooted in their own states or other 
supervising international authorities.      
Indeed, whether related to humanitarian intervention or not, both states and international 
organizations all calculate their interests carefully when asked to engage in war. Both are as 
likely to cooperate with other states in avoiding a particular mission than to participate in it, 
since the risks of failure are high for domestic political leaders as well as international bodies 
whose credibility diminishes with each institution-sponsored failure.4 Like their militaries, states 
are also hesitant to place sovereign militaries under UN authority, especially given its history of 
peacekeeping failures.5 Understandably, when the economic, political, and national security 
interests of a state do not align with justifications for assistance and intervention, they may either 
decide to ignore pleas for help or get other states to ‘cooperate’ with them in a kind of collective 
inaction to avoid commitment (Holmes 2014; Fenton, 2009; Paris 2014). In the search to remedy 
state and international failure to act in a crisis, some advocate in privatizing military functions 
with PMCs.6 For many reasons, however, this solution has not proven a viable option.   
 
4 The 1993 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the 1995 United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 
the 1999 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the 2003 genocide in Darfur, failed state-hood in Somalia, and the lack of 
involvement in the 2011 Syrian Civil War (Kurth 2005; Mayer 2009). 
 
5 Inaction led to the symptomatic emergence of The Right to Protect (R2P), obligating states with the responsibility to protect civilians and 
provide humanitarian intervention in parallel to security stabilization. However, enforcing R2P is difficult due to the veto power as a component 
in the voting system of the Security Council. Many look to the UN Peacekeepers as an enforcer of R2P amid conflict; however, the operational, 
administrative and security limitations of the UN Peacekeepers substantially impairs their response as a capable force for security stabilization in 
post-conflict nation-building (Berdal 2018; Gregg et al. 2015; Østensen 2001; UN Department of Public Information, 1999, 2005a, b, 2018; UN 
General Assembly and Security Council, 2000; UN Security Council 1946, 2008; UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to 
Protect, n.d.; UN Peacekeeping 2008, 2019; Serafino 2007;  Sheehan 2008; Siobhán, 2018; Smit 2018; Welsh 2013).  
 
6 The international community has considered post-conflict outsourcing from UN Peacekeepers to PMCs. PMCs can provide specialized and cost-
effective services, as well as offering operational; however opponents point to their history of criminal activities, unethical behavior, limited 
10 
The US Military as Humanitarian Facilitator 
 The picture we have painted thus far confirms the rather conventional argument that 
neither states nor international bodies like the UN are models of how to achieve post-conflict 
humanitarian stabilization. And yet as suggested, some form of military security—whether state 
or international sponsored—is not only necessary to any such endeavors, but has arguably 
demonstrated its success on occasion. Like other states facing calls to use its military for 
humanitarian purposes, the US has relevant experience worth examining here. The US has been 
actively involved in post-conflict security stabilization over the last 20 years, despite a 
conventional history of hesitation and reluctance to engage in military intervention and 
peacebuilding operations since the failures of the Clinton Administration (Day 1997; Dotson 
2016; Friedman & Gordon 1993; Holt & Mackinnon 2008; NPR 2013; Reuters 1993; Reyntjens 
1996). Notwithstanding the reluctance of the US to engage in humanitarian intervention, 
particularly under the auspices of UN authority, the exponential rise of conflict and its 
destabilizing effects requires that states maintain a certain level of military readiness to repress 
and stabilize post-conflict environments where its international or regional interests require it. 
That all changes with the rise of non-state actors.  
The introduction of non-state actors as destabilizing entities in a conflict has threatened 
international security and US interests abroad; however, the driving force behind the change of 
American intervention priorities were the September 11 attacks on American soil. These terrorist 
attacks reshaped the operational purpose and capability of the US military. The US rapidly 
deployed troops in offensive operations in Iraq and later Afghanistan, while American diplomats 
 
transparency, minimal accountability on contract oversight, human rights violations and access to sensitive operational information (e.g., Eric SA 
in Algeria in 1992, Ronco during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, MPRI in Liberia in 1995, ATS Tactical, and Select Armor in Somalia from 2006 
through 2008, among many others) (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski 2013; Mobley 2004). 
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sought support and justification of military invasion in the UN (Holt & Mackinnon 2008). 
President Bush indicated in his speech at the Virginia Military Institute, the National Security 
Strategy of 2002, that to ensure the long-term success of American military intervention in the 
Middle East, post-conflict reconstruction needed to become a priority and bedrock of both 
military and foreign policy efforts of the 21st century (Bush 2002a, b; Holt and Mackinnon, 
2008; Miller 2010).  
This brings into question the level of readiness of the US military to serve as an effective 
intervener of post-conflict security stabilization and reconstruction based on previous lessons 
learned (Pei & Kasper 2003). While certain studies seek to evaluate the unilateral performance of 
the US military in nation-building (Bowen & Collier 2012; Burkett 2012; Carson 2003), a new 
trend in scholarship has emerged from analyzing the impact of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
on the intricacies of civil-military partnerships with a lessons-learned approach. Many focus on 
the relationship between the US military, the Department of State (DoS), and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) as actors in post-conflict reconstruction (Ballou 
2014; Dobbins 2008; Rathmell 2005; Suhrke 2007). However, within this discourse community, 
an insignificant amount of attention has been given on the detailed accounts published by the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) as primary evaluators of the degree of American military 
success (Abdullah 2017; Chwastiak 2013; Coyne 2016; Jabareen 2012; Marchesi 2014; Samad 
2016). Various studies have recognized the overwhelming failures and limited success of nation-
building conducted by the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan when conducting different 
analyses (Ballou 2014; Coady 2002; Dodge 2005; Institute for Defense & Government 
Advancement 2013; Pollack 2006; Rashid 2009). 
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This analysis focuses on the current limits and possibilities encountered by the US 
military in establishing a continuous, working partnership with American humanitarian 
institutions (e.g., USAID or other private International Nongovernmental Organizations - 
INGOs) to stabilize conflict zones in order to implement humanitarian aid and assistance to 
affected populations. While the complexities of involving militaries as a tool of stabilization and 
post-conflict reconstruction are global in scope, it is imperative to note that it involves both State 
and non-state actors across many cases. The US will continue to engage in post-conflict nation-
building, and it is crucial to retrospectively analyze previous outcomes and formulate a more 
adaptive and dynamic strategy. The US will also continue to experiment and modify nation-
building strategies to meet mission objectives. This will only be possible by answering questions 
that encompass a comparative analysis of each case; how can the US effectively and 
systematically improve its future nation-building efforts in post-conflict regions? What dynamics 
are present in military-humanitarian cooperation (USAID) that needs to be reanalyzed? How can 
both the military and American government departments invoke ownership of the respective 
country and local stakeholders to solidify the continuity of nation-building efforts after 
withdrawal? This paper seeks to answer these critical questions that will unfold the multifaceted 
complexity of American efforts abroad, as well as derive factors that can directly impact the 
success of future efforts. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to learn how the US military 
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan might inform its future efforts to continue its partnership with 
USAID and other humanitarian organizations in order to facilitate lifesaving stabilization in the 
wake of ongoing or post-conflict scenarios. 
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Methodology 
As the framework of this research will consist of conducting a comparative analysis of 
Iraq and Afghanistan as two recent US civilian-military cooperation and coordination cases, 
USAID will symbolize the possibilities of other humanitarian organizations that can be involved 
with the US military in future nation-building. To achieve the above proposition, this study will 
first dissect individual actors primarily involved with nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Secondly, this analysis will scrutinize each case to provide valuable insight into the overall status 
of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan through insights offered by the SIGAR and SIGIR 
reports. Finally, the lessons learned from these reports will offer lessons learned from these two 
cases and propose strategic recommendations for future post-conflict humanitarian intervention 
and nation-building. Each section showcases the strengths of the selected methodology. 
This research contains key advantages within the selection of this methodology. First, the 
small sample of the extent of US military-humanitarian efforts has primarily occurred within the 
last 20 years. This will allow for a detailed and contemporary account of each reconstruction 
effort. Secondly, SIGAR and SIGIR have published extensively detailed reports on the outcomes 
of military-facilitated post-reconstruction efforts in each case. These reports prove to be useful in 
comprehending lessons learned, as well as the limits and possibilities of moving forward with 
recommendations for future joint projects. Despite its advantages, one limitation of this analysis 
is the paucity of cases encompassing military-humanitarian cooperation and coordination that 
will not allow for any statistically robust quantitative conclusion; consequently, causing this 
study to rely upon both qualitative and quantitative analysis. A final limitation encompasses the 
questionable success of counterinsurgency (COIN) contingent upon reliable leadership and 
various operational factors (Schlosser & Caiella 2011; The Department of the Army 2014; The 
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United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence 2018). A study conducted by RAND 
Corporations reports an idealistic multifaceted list of nation-building tasks in which the military 
has little to no control over all factors. The SIGAR and SIGIR reports account for the fact the 
military has done conflict suppression to some degree during the post-conflict scenario and so 
achieved a critical phase in the transition towards the quixotic objectives nation-building. Rather 
than addressing all seven tasks, the focus of the SIGIR and SIGAR reports were to analyze and 
recommend alterations to primarily one of seven subcomponents of nation-building; post-conflict 
reconstruction of development and infrastructure. To achieve that, it is imperative to observe one 
critical factor. 
A critical factor worth noting is that there is a lack of well-defined intervals or milestones 
of the spectrum that measures the level of nation-building, limiting the ability of this study to 
establish clear boundaries between the functions of humanitarian intervention and post-conflict 
reconstruction. Humanitarian intervention historically occurs amid conflict. Even when state 
security stabilization is not fully achieved, humanitarian intervention tends to develop towards 
the idea of nation-building. Post-conflict reconstruction are steps taken towards the monumental 
idea of nation-building – these two concepts are not identical. As a result, post-conflict 
reconstruction can happen without total territorial control, which this study will address in the 
case of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, security implications could lead to a relapse into a 
conflict that would require humanitarian intervention once again – a continuous cycle dependent 
on security stabilization. Thus, there is no agreed-upon metrics to define phases and clear 
transition from humanitarian intervention to post-conflict reconstruction within the idealistic 
spectrum of nation-building.  
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US Actors in Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
While there are no concrete metrics to measure success, there are identifiable essential 
actors addressed by SIGAR and SIGIR throughout the post-conflict reconstruction process. The 
United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) was the chief national-level actor in post-
conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan (Petraeus 2017). The national mission of the 
USACE was to build, manage, monitor and subcontract services to maximize the infrastructure 
of Afghanistan and Iraq to support military operations, as well as reconstruct and modernize 
different sectors (USACE 2019a, b).7 Estimated at $9 billion in construction and oversight at 
1,162 sites from 2002 to 2018, USACE built health facilities, roads, schools, military bases, 
housing, government facilities, and many other facilities encompassing all sectors (SIGAR 
2018a; USACE 2019c, d). Despite its efforts, USACE was not able to achieve DoD objectives 
alone. As a result of the departmental mission directives, the Integrated Civil-Military Affairs 
Group, a joint Department of Defense (DoD) and USAID initiative, implemented a plan that 
“operationalized the concept of stabilization and described how civilian and military 
organizations would work side-by-side in Afghanistan to stabilize priority areas from the bottom 
up,” while considering security and institutional challenges – Appendix B (SIGAR 2018c, 39).  
 The second actor analyzed in this study is USAID. Traditionally, USAID’s involvement 
in nation-building was contingent on the degree of involvement of DoD and the level of security 
provided by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mission priorities changed according to the 
unpredictable realities of post-conflict reconstruction, and along with it, financial obligations – 
Appendix C (Hammink 2017; USAID 2019a, b). USAID reported that its mission objective was 
 
7 According to the US Army, Section 886 of Public Law 110-181 (2008) empowered USACE to procure services and materials “using other than 
full and open competition for Acquisitions in support of Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan”. 
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to contextualize and integrate programs with the long-term development objective of 
stabilization and growth (Hammink 2017; USAID 2018a, 2019a, b). That was mainly conducted 
through job creation, poverty reduction and counterinsurgency support through the 
reconstruction and development of the infrastructure as a tool for economic growth and 
innovation (USAID 2012, 2015). As military interests in Iraq and Afghanistan began to dissipate, 
American politicians began to question the next step in the stabilization and sustainability of 
nation-building efforts – the mantle of post-conflict reconstruction and development was passed 
to USAID (Schlosser 2017). USACE indirectly maintained its involvement in a consultant 
capacity on construction projects, or at minimum, assisting in procuring subcontractors (Dobbins 
2019). Civil-military partnerships, such as USAID and USACE, required third-party oversight to 
ensure the integrity and transparency of nation-building projects – oversight was delegated to 
SIGAR and SIGIR.8  
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) 
As the US military focused on security and capacity building of the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) as an objective of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, USAID became the humanitarian 
arm of the American government tasked with spearheading post-conflict reconstruction in 
partnership with USACE (USAID 2018 a, b). To ensure accountability and transparency of funds 
allocated for nation-building, Congress mandated and empowered SIGAR to provide oversight 
of USAID and US military projects. Throughout its operations, SIGAR has uncovered critical 
deficiencies that saved over $3 billion of taxpayers’ money by conducting over “600 audits, 
inspections, and other reports”, leading to “more than 1,000 criminal and civil investigations” 
 
8 Former US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, saw civilian-military partnerships alternative to locals for a better future: “The military campaign 
must proceed hand-in-hand with a robust civilian effort that helps the Afghan government build credibility with its own people, offer alternatives 
to the insurgency and provide incentives for all afghans to renounce violence and work toward a better future” (USAID 2012). 
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(SIGAR 2018b; 2020a, e, 2).9 SIGAR uncovered three main critical deficiencies in the US 
military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan that threatened operational objectives and the 
lives of people.  
First, SIGAR discovered a lack of compliance with standards, including the International 
Building Code (IBC) and basic health regulations. In 2013, SIGAR submitted a letter to the 
Lieutenant General Thomas P. Bostick, the Commanding General and Chief of Engineer of 
USACE to alert of potential life-threatening fire and safety risks of the 1,002 K-Span structures 
either directly built or subcontracted by USACE for ANA (SIGAR 2013a). The insulation and 
thermal barrier systems used in K-Span structures did not comply with IBC standards, which has 
caused past fires that resulted in almost $1 million in property damage (SIGAR 2013a). On the 
other hand, SIGAR also uncovered the lack of compliance with basic health regulations when 
physically inspecting 269 of 664 USAID-supported health facilities in nearly 75% of the 
provinces in Afghanistan – Appendix H (SIGAR 2020c). Clinics faced serious structural 
deficiencies: exposed wires, cracked walls, shattered windows, intermittent potable water and 
electricity, leaking roofs, limited sanitation, and waste management (some facilities were never 
used – Appendix H). The lack of compliance threatened the lives of soldiers and civilians. 
Secondly, investigations uncovered inaccurate and incomplete data reports of joint 
USACE and USAID monitoring and evaluation activities. For example, from 2007 through 
2009, SIGAR reported that over half of CERP files were incomplete; as a result, the US Army 
Audit Agency conducted an independent investigation and discovered that “92.6 percent of the 
records reviewed—212 of 229—were not complete, and the gaps were often important 
documents” of the 3,000 incomplete projects (SIGAR 2018c, 100). Discrepancies in data 
 
9 The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 empowered SIGAR to conduct investigations and audits of US initiatives in Afghanistan to “1) 
promote efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction programs and, 2) detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse” (SIGAR 2020d). 
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reporting hinder measuring the impact of funds that focused on improving the livelihoods of the 
local population in post-conflict reconstruction and strengthening ANA. Incomplete contractual 
data decreased the accuracy of USACE reports; however, SIGAR also published various reports 
on the inaccuracy of the monitoring and evaluation practices of The Partnership Contracts for 
Health (PCH) Program and the System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) 
Program under joint USACE and USAID operations.10 
 The monitoring and evaluation activities inspected by SIGAR consisted of three stages: 
confirmation, evaluation and reporting. 11 As part of the first step, SIGAR John F. Sopko 
submitted a letter in 2015 to the Acting Administrator of USAID, Alfonso E. Lenhardt, 
requesting additional information to confirm the locations of PCH and SEHAT facilities (SIGAR 
2015a). In partnership with the US Army’s Geospatial Center and Digital Globe Imagery, 
SIGAR investigated all reported data and geospatial imagery of coordinates to confirm the 
location of 641 health care facilities. Numerous inconsistencies were found. SIGAR reported 13 
duplicated coordinates, 43 erroneous coordinates (six coordinates located in Pakistan, six in 
Tajikistan, and one in the Mediterranean Sea), and 120 mismatched districts - Appendix F and G 
(SIGAR 2015a,b). Multiple facility locations were either reported with a structure far from a 
respective coordinate or with no structure at all. In response, the USAID Assistant to the 
Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA), Donald L. Sampler, 
 
10 The PCH and the SEHAT programs funded assistance to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) to deliver essential health services to 
approximately 10.6 million Afghans in 13 provinces – Appendix E (SIGAR 2018c; 2019b). The activities of this program consisted of increasing 
functioning primary health care facilities, supporting Community Midwifery Education contracts, establishing public health public-private 
partnerships and creating a monitoring system at the provincial level (USAID 2019a,b). 
 
11  The first stage of inspections consists of confirming the location and the data provided by USAID. The second stage in SIGAR’s investigation 
process consisted of a 1-2 hours inspection by a team that annotated the date, time, coordinate verification, and photographed every facility 
visited and analyzed the “overall assessment of the facility” (SIGAR 2016d). This overall assessment included: “(outside and inside), recording, 
among other information, the geospatial coordinates of the facility, whether the facility appeared to be open and operational, and whether the 
facility had reliable access to electricity and water, and an on-site pharmacy,” as well as sanitation and safety concerns” (SIGAR 2016d). The 
final stage consisted of publishing detailed findings that accounted for deficiencies and recommendations of each facility (SIGAR 2019a,b). 
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responded to Sopko’s first letter by assuring that USAID was now working with the Afghanistan 
MOPH to rectify the discrepancies (SIGAR 2015b).12 However, after SIGAR analyzed the 
second submitted updated list, Sopko still discovered multiple errors (SIGAR 2015b). Inaccuracy 
leads to errors, but it also exacerbates the level of impact of fraud and waste. 
Third, fraud and waste directly tied to subcontractors and US soldiers directly diminished the 
view of the US military as a competent actor. For example, Mercury Development, a 
subcontractor of USACE, received $3.1 million of the $3.4 million of their contract before 
completing the Sheberghan Teacher Training Facility building project. As a result, Mercury 
Development abandoned the project and USACE had to terminate “the contract and released the 
company from further contractual liability,” (SIGAR 2017d, 2). Fraud and waste served as 
opportunities for various criminal convictions of US soldiers directly impacting the legitimacy of 
military efforts in post-conflict reconstruction – Appendix D. Thus, SIGAR investigations 
concluded joint USACE and USAID operations faced critical systematic deficiencies.13  
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 
 Much like USACE operations in Afghanistan, the Gulf Region Division of USACE 
served as the primary construction administrator and manager of all sectors in Iraq that supported 
contracts designated to the Task Forces to Restore Iraqi Oil and Iraqi Electricity funds (SIGIR 
2013a).14 SIGIR reported that USACE completed over 5,000 projects estimated at $8.27 billion 
(SIGIR 2013a).15 The approach of USAID and USACE in Iraq was different from Afghanistan 
 
12 Sopko’s first letter can be found in the SIGAR report 15-67-SP, Inquiry Letter: Geospatial Coordinates for PCH Health Facilities. 
 
13 SIGAR concluded that “USAID and DoD stabilization efforts in Afghanistan were marked by poor situational awareness, a lack of reliable 
data, a mismatch between short project timelines and highly ambitious long-term goals, and frequent shifts in priorities” (SIGAR 2018c). 
 
14 The National Security President Directive 36 empowered the Gulf Region Division of USACE (SIGIR 2013a). 
 
15 The purpose of USACE in Iraq was to rebuild critical infrastructure and “restore Iraq’s oil infrastructure so that it could reach pre-war 
production and export levels” since the Iraq invasion caused approximately $457 million from military conflict and $943 million due to 
depreciation (SIGIR 2013a). 
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because the focus was mostly on security and the rule of law; however, funds directed towards 
infrastructure development targeted water, sanitation, energy, and the health sector – Appendix J 
(SIGIR 2013a). To ensure that the funds allocated to nation-building were appropriately utilized, 
SIGIR was mandated with the responsibility to provide oversight, investigations and audits of the 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, targeting misuse of all funds associated with American nation-
building (SIGIR 2013b).16 Throughout the entire US military involvement in Iraq, SIGIR 
conducted over 220 audits and 170 investigations that reported mishaps that directly impacted 
the credibility of the DoD and USAID as effective actors in post-conflict reconstruction – 
Appendix I (SIGIR 2013a).17 SIGIR reported two main critical issues as a result of their 
investigations: structural deficiencies and inaccurate reported data. 
First, many facilities encountered structural flaws. For example, it is estimated that over 
$1.65 billion was allocated for the construction and maintenance of military buildings, barracks, 
and dining facilities (SIGIR 2013a). USACE invested over $165 million to expand the prison 
capacity in Iraq by awarding contracts to build the Nassiriya and Khan Bani Sa’ad prisons 
(SIGIR 2013a).18 After both the contract and the project were terminated due to deficiencies, 
SIGIR inspected several sections of each facility and concluded that the construction done by 
Parsons Delaware Inc did not meet safety standards and recommended for the facilities never to 
be used (SIGIR 2006a, 2013a). Structural deficiencies were also discovered in the health sector. 
As another example, USACE and USAID recognized that Iraq’s underdeveloped public 
health system was a threat to long-term sustainability and decided to actively participate in 
 
 
16 Public Law 108-106 created the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 
 
17 Iraq faced severe limitations superimposed by corruption, waste, fraud, and lack of proficient management and administrative skills by the US 
military and the Iraqi government. SIGIR investigations led to 82 convictions and saved over $1.6 billion of taxpayers' money (SIGIR 2013a). 
 
18 The original plan was to expand the facilities to accommodate over 3,600 beds; however, Parsons Delaware Inc. faced cost overruns, delayed 
the construction schedule, and did not adhere to specifications in the contract (SIGIR 2013a). 
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rebuilding the health sector (SIGIR 2013a).19 The Iraq Primary Healthcare Center (IPCH) 
program was developed to impact over 4 million Iraqis by building 150 clinics around the 
country at the total $362 million – Appendix K (SIGIR 2013a). Similar to the SEHAT and PCH 
program in Afghanistan, USACE was in charge of oversight and management in Iraq and 
subcontracted Parsons Delaware, Inc. to provide design and construction services in the building, 
housing and health care (SIGIR 2006b, 2013a).20 Throughout the entire contract with Parsons, 
SIGIR physically audited the status of 109 facilities and discovered various shortcomings in the 
structural integrity of buildings (39 facilities), the plumbing (37 facilities) and sewage systems 
(29 facilities), the electrical systems (36 facilities), and many others areas (SIGIR 2013a). Over 
$9 million was spent on maintenance and structural corrections (SIGIR 2013a). Areas of priority 
included the generator and electrical systems ($3.9 million), the interior and exterior of facilities 
($1.3 million), plumbing and septic system ($465,000), along with others (SIGIR 2013a).  
A second critical area uncovered by SIGIR inspections was inaccurate reported data. 
Similar to the incorrect GPS coordinates reported by SIGAR, SIGIR randomly selected ten PHC 
facilities and discovered that four of the ten facilities were located in an empty field – no 
construction was done (SIGIR 2009a).21 The results of the SIGIR inspections reported similar 
findings to those of SIGAR in Afghanistan – inaccuracy and mismanagement have diminished 
the impact and effectiveness of financial resources that could have been reallocated to other vital 
 
19 From 2003 to 2012, approximately $934 million was designated for the creation of health projects (SIGIR 2013a). 
 
20 Part of the project included the procurement and furnishing of medical equipment to the clinics that were built by Parsons: x-ray equipment, 
blood analyzers, examination tables, defibrillators, ventilators, and incubators, as well as office supplies and furniture (SIGIR 2010). 
 
21  SIGAR concluded that the IPHC program had “cost substantially more than planned, taken much longer to complete, and produced fewer 
facilities…unless flawed policies, plans, procedures, and accounting for the status of completed and turned over assets is improved, US funded 
infrastructure projects will remain highly vulnerable to become wasted” (SIGIR 2009a). 
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projects. 22 The US military needs to restructure and re-strategize by considering lessons learned 
in these two cases to better prepare for future nation-building efforts.23  
Lessons Learned 
 While it is acknowledged that post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term process, the 
normative response and management system of the US military and other US government 
departments are well-established (Dobbins et al. 2005; Hammink 2017). Post-conflict 
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplified these systematic norms over the last two 
decades, showcasing the fragility and complexity of projects contingent upon the fragile balance 
of US interests and the socio-economic and political realities of each country. SIGIR and SIGAR 
highlighted the shortcomings of these norms as well as exposed the fundamental challenges 
associated with post-conflict reconstruction. In contribution, this study offers five lessons learned 
which can be applied to future post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
Lesson One: Compliance with Infrastructure Standards and Regulations 
National, regional, and international standards in health and infrastructure are essential for 
personnel safety, as well as critical for ensuring the sustainable and long-term viability of 
projects. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq often disregarded standards 
and regulations; consequently, facilities faced continuous degradation to the point that it would 
require extensive maintenance to ensure the perpetual use of those buildings. For example, 
USAID-funded and USACE built health care facilities were not in compliance with public health 
care standards and regulations of the Center for Disease Control (CDC), The Joint Commission 
 
22 USAID encountered various contracting challenges that led to “project delays and, ultimately, charges for overhead with no work being carried 
out” (SIGIR 2013a). 
 
23 DoS veteran and author concluded that, “of the many lessons to be drawn from Iraq reconstruction, the most compelling speaks to the need to 
develop an agreed-upon doctrine and structure for contingency relief and reconstruction operations to guide the use of military and economic 
power so that the United States is ready when it next must intervene in a failed or failing state” (Buren 2011; Murphey 2013). 
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(JCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) – basic standards that primary care and 
urgent care clinics, as well as hospitals, are required to follow in the US. The lack of monitoring 
and evaluation, including minimal regulatory compliance, can be life-threatening to the patient 
population. Water contaminants24, waste disposal25 and intermittent electricity are three critical 
issues that need to be resolved to impede the spread of noncommunicable diseases (Gayer et al. 
2007). Thus, the first lesson for future post-conflict reconstruction is the importance of 
compliance with national, regional, and international professional standards and regulations for 
all infrastructure and health projects. Noncompliance will only exacerbate issues that post-
conflict reconstruction was attempting to resolve in the first place, decreasing safety, increasing 
damage, exacerbating health issues, and crippling long-term health and economic development. 
Lesson Two: The Cycle of Fraud, Waste, and Mismanagement 
Whenever tens of thousands of projects and billions of dollars are injected in post-
conflict reconstruction, resources are susceptible to fraud, waste, and mismanagement. 
Subcontractors, soldiers, and government employees attempt to illegally take advantage of 
contracts and systems to result in personal, financial, or political gain. This seems to be uniform 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the level and intention of involvement in post-conflict 
reconstruction (SIGAR 2019a,b).26 Limited financial resources are allocated to critical programs 
 
24 The use of unfiltered water in medical facilities exposes patients and staff to various strands of bacteria, including Pseudomonas, gram-negative 
bacteria, and the nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM). This can lead to “pulmonary disease in adults; cervical lymph node disease in children; 
skin, soft tissue, and bone infections; and disseminated disease in immunocompromised patients” (Sehulster et al. 2004). 
 
25 Improper waste disposal procedures and exposure to biohazard waste, as addressed by JCO’s 3.3.1.3 recommendation, can be life-threatening 
(Braun et al., 2012). It can lead to Gastroenteric infections caused by Enterobacteria (e.g., Salmonella, Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, Clostridium 
difficile, etc.), respiratory infections caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis (e.g., Streptococcus pneumoniae and the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome - SARS), as well as many other forms of infections (Chartier et al. 2014). On the other hand, intermittent electricity is a precarious 
problem for Neonatal and Intensive Care Unit (NICU and ICU) patients, emergency rooms, and immunization and pharmaceutical storage that 
depend on a reliable source of electricity for life-saving interventions (Roberts, Patel, & Mckee 2012). 
 
26 Despite the limited resources of the PHC and SEHAT programs, SIGAR reported that an 11-room medical clinic built in the Walayatti village 
in the Khandahar province has never been used - $200,000 of taxpayer funds have been wasted (SIGAR 2013b). Similarly, USACE and USAID 
subcontracted a local construction company to build the Salang Hospital in the Parwan province for over $500,000, resulting in merely 35% of 
the facility being used and reported to have various structural deficiencies (SIGAR 2016b). 
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that seek to further economic development, post-conflict stabilization, and improve public health 
in underdeveloped regions. Similarly, SIGIR also concluded that USACE and DoD lack proper 
management of funds distributed for reconstruction projects by mishandling contracts of 
subcontractors and not maintaining a database of contractual commitments (SIGIR 2009b).27 
Therefore, the second lesson in post-conflict reconstruction is that the vicious cycle of fraud, 
waste, and mismanagement is inevitable, but strict oversight and mitigation measures may 
decrease the extent of illicit activities before it exponentially grows. Decreasing the impact of 
fraud, waste, and mismanagement is necessary to maximize the use of funds to impact post-
conflict reconstruction and its move towards stabilization positively. 
Lesson Three: Inaccurate Reporting 
The accurate and timely monitoring and evaluation of post-conflict reconstruction 
projects are essential for measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of projects, as well as to 
provide post-conflict reconstruction leaders with correct data to assist in policymaking and funds 
reallocation. Unfortunately, this was not the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. The monitoring and 
evaluation process in those two countries is complex, multilayered, and dependent on multiple 
private and public organizations, as well as hundreds of individuals (SIGAR 2015b). For 
example, USACE and USAID subcontracted third-party foreign nationals’ staff in Kabul to visit, 
monitor, and evaluate an estimated 2,331 facilities in 13 provinces with active projects, but 
various deficiencies in the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting process led to incorrect GPS 
coordinates, crumbling infrastructure, and decaying projects (SIGAR 2015b).28 
 
27 In 2007 alone, USACE approximately “$3.0 million in DFI [Development Fund for Iraq] funds for potential liabilities associated with open 
reconstruction contracts, and one USACE contractor has about $2.2 million it said was for work that had been completed but not yet approved for 
payment” (SIGIR 2009b). 
 
28 There are three leading subcontractors in charge of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for USACE and USAID projects: 1) Measuring Impacts 
of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI), 2) Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc ($52.2 million contracts), 3) Versar Inc ($90 million contracts) 
(SIGAR, 2015b; SIGAR, 2019c; USAID, 2012). To ensure proper mitigation of deficiencies in M&E, Sampler asserted that USAID meets with a 
25 
Furthermore, DoD and USAID also inaccurately reported information on the success of post-
conflict reconstruction programs that impacts the direction of policymaking and fund 
reallocation. The accuracy of data reported by USACE and USAID is unconvincing; the 
reliability29 of monitoring is also debatable. SIGAR was able to identify that USAID never 
disclosed the baseline data to measure the reported increases, but auditors found that estimates 
came from reports from the World Health Organization that was not conducted with USAID 
(SIGAR, 2020b).30 Claims by USAID consisted of no baseline data for comparison, increased 
the correct data reported that came from WHO, and at times has a limited population impact 
survey that miscalculated the true extent of the impact in the entire country (SIGAR, 2020b).31 
Post-conflict reconstruction is an extensive and monumental task, increasing the 
difficulty of monitoring and reporting; however, while acknowledging this intricate task, the 
third lesson from post-conflict reconstruction is that the muddled monitoring and evaluation 
processes impair any accurate reporting. Without settled metrics, a learned and simplified 
reporting process, and oversight in data quality management, the reliability of data that 
represents the effectiveness and efficiency of projects will never be conclusive.  
 
 
 
consultant from the Grants Contract Management Unit (GCMU) at least every two months, or immediately if an urgent situation arises, to present 
findings and resolve issues (SIGAR 2015b). 
 
29 USAID reported substantial improvements in the status of women in Afghanistan, spending over $850 million on 17 projects; however, the 
lack of the evaluation of metrics led USAID officials not to be able to tell SIGAR auditors how much of the money invested directly supported 
Afghan women (SIGAR 2020b). 
 
30 Of the $1 billion invested in rule-of-law projects in Afghanistan, SIGAR discovered that “while the 2009 US rule-of-law strategy for 
Afghanistan contained 27 specific performance measures, the 2013 strategy contained no performance measures at all” (SIGAR, 2020b). In 2014, 
the USAID Administrator asserted that “3 million girls and 5 million boys are enrolled in school—compared to just 900,000 when the Taliban 
ruled Afghanistan”, as well as “child mortality has been cut [in Afghanistan] by 60 percent, maternal mortality has declined by 80 percent, and 
access to health services has been increased by 90 percent”, referring to the positive impacts of USAID programs (SIGAR 2020b). 
 
31 SIGAR reported that “MISTI concluded that stabilization programming led to an increase in support for the Taliban in 13 of the 72 villages that 
were Taliban controlled, had no government or coalition presence, but still received a USAID stabilization project during the period studied” 
(SIGAR 2018c ). 
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Lesson Four: Security versus Development 
 SIGIR and SIGAR reports illustrate that the cost of proper maintenance required to 
maintain the safety stands expected in any high-quality roads and facilities are high. Without a 
stable region, states can collapse into failed states or relapse into conflict, which will be 
detrimental to the long-term viability of the infrastructure by creating a continuous cycle of 
reconstruction and destruction. Consequently, instability brings uncertainty to the financial 
viability of attracting investments for maintenance due to the increase in political and economic 
risk caused by the damage of the infrastructure (Mardirosian 2010). Another aspect to consider is 
the transfer of maintenance responsibility from the US military to the host country. If the host 
country is financially unable to maintain the upkeep of the infrastructure, the government will be 
dependent on foreign funding. This defeats the fundamental purpose of rebuilding a country to 
be sustainable. Thus, it is clear that any sustainable long-term infrastructure development 
requires a stable and secure region, and that directly impacts the efficiency of health programs 
and intervention as a tool of development. 
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) carried out by the US military provided short-
term medical intervention with no intention of establishing long-term medical development 
(Dziedzic & Seidl 2005; Hammink 2017; Keane & Wood 2015; McHugh & Gostelow 2004; 
McNerney 2006; Perito 2005; Waller et al. 2011). Both long-term development in the health 
sector and medical intervention is contingent upon the extent of security stabilization. The SIGIR 
and SIGAR report analyzed focused on the infrastructure aspect of USAID and USACE projects; 
however, sustainable health development can only happen when the entirety of the sector can 
function to meet demand. This includes the supply chain of medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals, continuous maintenance of facilities, accountability in patient safety and 
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infection control, capacity building of the MOPH and medical providers, and the long-term 
capacity to treat chronic health conditions that require long-term and specialized care. Not only 
does the lack of security threaten the system of healthcare, but it risks the lives of medical 
providers – attacks on medical neutrality continue to be a significant issue (Chrappova et al. 
2017; Elamein et al. 2017; Fouad et al. 2017; Heisler et al. 2015; International Committee of the 
Red Cross 2018). Any viable long-term sustainable development of the health sector depends on 
the stabilization of security.  
Finding a balance between development and security is essential to impede long-term 
dependency because other countries would not participate in burden-sharing. This balance seeks 
to spur development and strengthen the rule of law. These factors are necessary to work towards 
Democratization, and as the end result, achieve peace as supported by the Democratic Peace 
Theory. Therefore, the fourth lesson in post-conflict reconstruction is that while short-term 
humanitarian intervention can temporarily alleviate the detriments of conflict, long-term 
development in infrastructure and health cannot happen without security stabilization (Coady 
2002). Countries need to be both financially and administratively ready to be autonomous to 
receive the responsibility of maintenance required to maintain a viable long-term infrastructure 
to influence health and economic growth, clearly exemplified in the IPHC program. 
Lesson Five: Inconsistency in Leadership 
As previously addressed, post-conflict reconstruction requires a multifaceted, multilevel, 
and multistage process from multiple actors within the US government and abroad. Each leader 
serves as a fundamental block that builds the overarching post-conflict reconstruction system. 
Regardless of the depth of impact, each leader serves a critical role to fulfill the overall objective. 
In a utopian post-conflict reconstruction response, leaders that represent each stakeholder are the 
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same in the planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation process in post-conflict 
reconstruction; however, that is not the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. Local, national, and 
international actors, including different departments of the US government, have a high turnover 
rate.32 The inconsistency presents a critical challenge in establishing and adhering to uniform 
institutional objectives. New leaders have dissimilar skillsets, selected new personnel, and 
implement distinct strategies to obtain different goals. This applies to all stakeholders who are 
invested in obtaining favorable results. 
 The issue of consistency of leadership also impacts the strategy design for post-conflict 
reconstruction – that was the problem in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather than tailoring a post-
conflict reconstruction response unique to the socio-economic, political, cultural, ethnic, 
religious challenges and opportunities of that country, post-conflict reconstruction in 
Afghanistan and Iraq attempted a multifunctional, or a one-size-fits-all approach that proved to 
be disastrous (Myerson, 2012; SIGAR, 2018c).33 Afghanistan and Iraq are considerably different 
in the condition of functioning infrastructure, level of urbanization, income disparities, health 
inequalities, unemployment, demographics breakdown, educational opportunities, and 
government capacity for security and delivering services.34 
Recommendations for Future Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
The nature of nation-building is heavily contingent upon the inimitable realities of the 
socio-economic, political, organizational, humanitarian, ethnic, religious, and security 
 
32 Deployments for military personal generally range from 90 days to 15 months, whereas military leadership at the Pentagon changes multiple 
times over 5-10 years (Lubold & Youssef, 2019; Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011; United States Army, 2020). In the case of 
subcontractors, project managers of the IPHC program changed six times over the project life-cycle (SIGIR, 2009a). 
 
33 The Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that “The challenge in Iraq is essentially one of rebuilding, whereas in 
Afghanistan it is one of building from scratch. . . . [In Iraq,] there was some tradition of central authority and organization on which a new, more 
reasonable order might take root and grow” (Nelson et al., 2009). 
 
34 For example, in Afghanistan, SIGAR reported that the strategy to drive out Taliban forces, which can be integrated into COIN operations, 
could be different. In essence, one community may require physical security, whereas the other might need an increase in government oversight 
in services (SIGAR, 2018c). 
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implications of the evaluated country or region; hence, it is both incongruous and unrealistic to 
provide tangible and standardized solutions to unknown future efforts. It is imperative to note 
that this study reflects a small sample of two conflicts in the last 20 years; therefore, as 
previously mentioned, the paucity of cases encompassing military-humanitarian cooperation and 
coordination that will not allow for any statistically robust quantitative conclusion. However, 
after scrutinizing both qualitative and quantitative factors of US military nation-building efforts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan through reports published by SIGAR and SIGIR, there are five broad 
recommendations to be considered for future military nation-building efforts. 
1. Fortifying Monitoring and Evaluation Systems 
An underlying theme in the published SIGAR and SIGIR reports the necessity to 
develop, strengthen, and maintain monitoring and evaluation systems to facilitate proper 
mitigation of fraud, waste, corruption, and mismanagement in local and international contractors, 
government officials, and US agencies. Bolstering funding and expanding the staff of Inspector 
General’s offices appointed by Congress is essential to combat the elements that weaken the 
legitimacy of the nation-building conducted. Appointed US Inspector Generals should also 
provide capacity-building technical advisors to concretize the institutional strategies and 
mechanisms needed for the host government to be prepared and capable of providing oversight 
in future projects. Another possibility is to invite watchdog INGOs, such as Transparency 
International, the UN, and other reputable third-party monitors, to preserve the integrity of the 
nation-building process. However, the US military could be hesitant to welcome external 
monitors, as it possibly will halter covert methods and proprietary information used in 
operations, as well as potentially increase the bureaucracy involved to carry out projects. Overall, 
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the US military needs to consider welcoming oversight authorities to detect and prevent fraud, 
waste, corruption, and mismanagement – potentializing funds for post-conflict reconstruction. 
2. Unified Objectives 
 Continuous institutional leadership throughout the entirety of the nation-building 
endeavor can be considered utopian, as military leaders, public administrators, and government 
officials do not maintain their leadership positions during the entire process. Consistency is 
threatened by turnover rates, term limits, and, at times, inconsistent leadership objectives. 
Consequently, each actor, government departments/agencies, militaries, and stakeholders could 
have different objectives (rooted in economic and political goals) that can impact the realization 
of a sustainable response to nation-building. There is a lack of unified objectives by each entity 
responding in nation-building programs throughout every stage of the response. Future US 
military post-conflict reconstruction efforts need to establish an overarching and multisectoral 
executive strategy that will last throughout the entire nation-building process: including security, 
economic, political, and organizational. Without such a plan, stakeholders will continue to seek 
autonomy and potentially fall short of post-conflict reconstruction objectives. 
3. Planning for Continuous Maintenance 
 Dependency on foreign assistance exponentially diminishes self-reliance that can result in 
a long-term yoke of disproportional diplomatic and economic consequences to both the donor 
and the recipient. A post-conflict reconstruction strategy needs to account for the immediate 
population need, as well as the realities involved in the continuous maintenance of the 
infrastructure and programs by the host government once the US military and agencies withdraw 
from the region.35 If the government is unable to incur the maintenance cost, then any post-
 
35 For example, if the US military builds a new hospital to increase access to medical services, it begs the question if the local or federal 
government of the host nation has the financial ability and public policy flexibility to incur a new longstanding expense of maintenance. If they 
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conflict reconstruction efforts will degrade. Consequently, the government will depend on 
foreign assistance to rebuild and refinance the maintenance of previous projects. This was a 
critical dilemma uncovered by SIGAR with health facilities projects developed by joint US 
military and USAID programs. Therefore, post-conflict reconstruction is more than merely 
building new facilities – it is strategizing and reconstituting both financial and public policies to 
become financially self-reliant. 
4. Sustainable Localization and Contextualization 
An effective nation-building strategy is tailored to the unique realities of a post-conflict 
environment. The contextualization of post-conflict strategies needs to carefully and respectfully 
reconcile the sensitivity of both local customs and traditions with the elements that lead to 
economic and political progress. Contextualization is imperative to eliminate the harmful 
connotation of American Imperialism or Westernization in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.36 
Another aspect of contextualization is the approach in which the military influences local 
perception of their involvement in nation-building. Winning the hearts and minds should not be 
achieved with US military personnel but accomplished through localization. 
 Localization is the involvement of national entities and local stakeholders to provide local 
solutions to local problems. A localized approach to nation-building should instill accountability 
and compel locals to be invested in regional outcomes. Local government, national 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), faith and cultural organizations, and other influential 
 
are unable, then that facility will deteriorate, face supply shortages, and shortly become incapable of financially maintain the staff – it becomes a 
future abandoned hospital, relapsing and reestablishing a need that was initially resolved during post-conflict reconstruction. This is applicable 
across every sector: roads, schools, waste management services, government facilities, military bases, and others. 
 
36 For example, the rule of law and government legitimacy is essential to combat corruption and fraud, and that can be achieved through effective 
democratization – a subcomponent of nation-building; however, the legitimization of the judicial system needs to overcome the barriers of the 
Maslaha and other faith and traditionally-based jurisprudence systems that challenge the acceptance of democracy and the rule of law. Once the 
legitimization of the judicial system is achieved, locals would be liable for criminal offenses that threaten the success of post-conflict 
reconstruction, such as fraud, waste, corruption, and other financial offenses. 
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institutions need to be prepared to provide long-term support to the local population. That is why 
capacity-building in a contextualized and localized approach is essential for the viability of any 
long-term sustainable program. This, as a result, will decrease the long-term dependency of the 
local population on foreign support. If further specialized support is needed, embedding technical 
advisors can be a plausible long-term solution to ensure a viable outcome. Therefore, the US 
military should utilize USAID to advise on contextualized and localized approaches and 
prioritize award contracts to local companies to promote a sustainable solution. 
5. Security Stabilization versus Reconstruction Efforts 
 The co-dependency of security stabilization and long-lasting post-conflict reconstruction 
is evident. Proper risk evaluation and mitigation are needed to ensure the proper level and type of 
security response, including physical, psychological, and cybersecurity. As seen with insurgents, 
terrorist organizations, and other combatants, if a country-wide security stabilization is not 
achieved, it is possible for subnational jurisdictions to relapse from post-conflict reconstruction 
and once again require emergency humanitarian intervention. This cycle of relapse will continue 
until total security stabilization is reached or if unforeseen external factors, such as 
environmental disasters, are in play. As a result, the lack of security leads to extensive damages 
in project infrastructure, disrupts supply chains, burdens the fragile healthcare system, 
exacerbates economic, ethnic, and religious divides, multiplies the cost of a security force, 
increases the number of lives lost, and widens the gap of socio-economic disparity – totaling in 
an overall weakening of political, economic, and diplomatic competitiveness in the region. 
Therefore, the US military needs to find a balance between security stabilization operations and 
reconstruction objectives to maximize the efficiency and efficacy of future nation-building, 
whether that is achieved through the restructuring of internal system structures and 
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institutionalizing nation-building training for each subdivision or the concretization of congruent 
joint-USAID and military response by facilitating a unified policy approach. 
Conclusion 
 The limits and possibilities of US military efforts in nation-building are substantially 
contingent upon the individual actors and stakeholders directly involved at each operational 
level, the gravity of security concerns and unpredictability interconnected with any causal 
elements (e.g., economic, political, ethnic, religion, among others), the underlying reason for 
American intervention, as well as autonomy and expectations superimposed by the host 
government. In order to provide a focused comparative analysis, this study comprehensively 
examined SIGAR and SIGIR reports in light of nation-building efforts by the US military, which 
in turn, concluded that it is interdependent with USAID. The deficiencies uncovered the audits 
conducted by SIGAR and SIGIR solidified the limitations contingent upon the balance of long-
term development and security stabilization. Military efforts in Iraq focused on the 
reconstruction of a semi-operational government system, whereas, Afghanistan led to the rise of 
extensive and unprecedented development and infrastructure projects with a clean slate (Monten  
2014; Nelson et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, the analysis of SIGAR and SIGIR facilitated this study to offer four unique 
lessons learned from post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. First, compliance with 
standards and regulations in infrastructure is essential for the health and safety of all actors. 
Secondly, a vicious cycle of fraud, waste, and mismanagement is inevitable, but stricter 
mitigation measures should be firmly established before financing any projects. Third, the 
muddled monitoring and evaluation processes impair accurate reporting of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of nation-building. Reliable data is needed in order to maximize efforts and 
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reallocate funds accordingly. Fourth, the imbalance between security and long-term development 
directly impacts infrastructure and health – they are directly contingent upon each other. 
As a result of the limitations revealed in the five lessons learned, this study offered 
essential recommendations that can impact the future possibilities of nation-building by the US 
military. First, it is essential to invest in fortifying monitoring and evaluation systems to combat 
fraud, waste, corruption, and mismanagement. Secondly, capacity building should realistically 
match the public policy and financial capabilities for the continuous maintenance of each project. 
The host nation should be able to take over all administrative and financial responsibilities to 
maintain each project. Third, localization and contextualization are imperative for a sustainable 
response. Socio-economic, political, ethnic, and religious factors are a driving force that can 
positively strengthen the probability of a sustainable response. Fourth, it is critical to have 
unified objectives by each responding entity throughout every stage of the response. Different 
objectives by different actors seeking different results will only exacerbate the root of the 
problem. Lastly, security stabilization is as important as reconstruction efforts. Continuous 
conflict and instability will undermine the integrity of nation-building projects, driving up the 
cost and time necessary to achieve expected goals. 
The cases utilized in this study, despite its contingent limitations, contribute to a clearer 
understanding of the possibilities offered by the US military, as well as other militaries, nation-
building focused on post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Further investigations on 
SIGAR and SIGIR reports are needed to focus on the other seven components of nation-building 
not discussed in this study. Each subcomponent of a nation-building strategy should be 
scrutinized for its compatibility with the above recommendations. Therefore, the US military is 
not prepared or capable of successfully engaging in all subcomponents of nation-building in 
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post-conflict reconstruction. Civilian-military cooperation continues to be critical in order to 
provide specialized intervention. Aa a result, any improvements in future nation-building efforts 
are dependent on the adapting, restructuring, and accepting of recommended amendments on a 
post-conflict reconstruction by SIGAR and SIGIR at each response level. Unless the US military 
alters its planning, execution, and coordination strategies, failure will be the recognized brand 
and expected outcome of any future military nation-building efforts. 
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Appendix A 
 
Afghanistan Stabilization Programming from 2002 to 2017 
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Appendix B 
 
USAID Funds per strategy change in AFGHANISTAN 
 
2002-2003 Complex Humanitarian Crisis, Counterterrorism, and Reconstruction. 
2004-2005 Reconstruction and Social Services Provision. 
2006-2008 Stabilization, Counter Narcotics, Pivot to Provinces. 
2009-2011 Counterinsurgency. 
2011-2014 Capacity Building, Energy Infrastructure, Transition. 
2014-2015 
Support a New Reform-Minded National Unity Following Presidential 
Elections.  
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Appendix C 
 
Overview of Two USAID’s Global Health Programs 
Perpetrator Offense 
Army National Guard 
Specialist 
Accepted numerous payments from $200 to $10,000 for 
accelerating payments of vendor’s invoices. 
Army Staff Sergeant 
Received $25,000 from several Afghan vendors to move up their 
firms in the rotation of suppliers and awarding them more 
profitable contracts. 
Navy Senior Chief 
Received $25,000 from several Afghan vendors to move up their 
firms in the rotation of suppliers and awarding them more 
profitable contracts. 
Army Sergeant First Class 
Received a payment of $100,000 and a Rolex watch for 
conspiracy to defraud in assisting a US Army first sergeant for 
conspiracy to commit money laundering. 
Source: SIGAR, 2020e 
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Appendix D 
Summary of SIGAR’s Geospatial Analysis of USAID-Reported Facility Locations 
Total Facilities 
Geospatial 
Analysis Results 
No structure within 400 feet: 
No structure within a half-mile: 
189 
81 
Structures present; none clearly indicated: 154 
Structure clearly indicated: 
Structure clearly indicated but district mismatched: 
 Structure clearly indicated by the 2nd duplicate coordinate: 
152 
19 
2 
No Geospatial Data Provided: 90 
Erroneous & Duplicate Geospatial Data, excluded from Geospatial Analysis:  56 
Total Locations of Concern: 510 
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Appendix E 
 
Overview of Two USAID’s Global Health Programs 
Programs 
 Partnership Contracts for 
Health (PCH) Program 
System Enhancement for Health Action in 
Transition (SEHAT) Program 
Duration 2008 - 2015 2015 - 2018 
Funds $259.6 million $228 million 
Organizations 
Involved 
Afghan Ministry of Public 
Health (MOPH) 
World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Afghan Ministry 
of Public Health (MOPH) 
Note. These programs directly impact over 540 health facilities, 27 district hospitals, 166 
comprehensive health centers, 276 basic health centers, five provincial hospitals, and over 
6,000 health posts. 
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Appendix F 
 
Summary of SIGAR’s Preliminary Analysis of USAID Facilities 
                                                                                                                Total Facilities 
Total Reported Facilities                                                                                           641 
Location of Data 
Summary 
         No location data provided 90 
         Location data provided 551 
Problems with Location Data Location data duplicated* 13 
Location data erroneous**  43 
        District mismatched^ 120 
         Total Missing or Problematic Coordinates^                   266 
Total Coordinates for Geospatial Analysis^*                                                            495
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Appendix G 
 
SIGAR Inspection Results Overview 
Provinces Findings Sources 
Badakhshan 
29 of the 30 facilities inspected consisted of broken windows, leaking roofs, 
cracked walls, as well as unreliable access to water and electricity. 
SIGAR, 2016c 
Baghlan 
Of 30 health care facilities, inspection teams reported harsh operational 
conditions that include poor maintenance of the structure, limited electricity, 
and water, inadequate lighting (when electricity is available), cracked walls, 
leaking roofs, shattered windows, and exposed wiring. 
SIGAR, 2016c 
Bamyan 
Various facilities in Bamyan were reported to have structural defects, 
ranging from leaking roofs and cracked walls, to the lack of access to water 
and electricity. The construction of one facility was never completed. 
SIGAR, 2016d 
Faryab 
Several health facilities were reported to have minimal access to electricity, 
with intermittent surges, as well as structural damage, leaking roofs, and 
exposed wiring. 
SIGAR, 2019a 
Ghazni 
30 of the 70 facilities inspected, SIGAR described a dangerous environment 
for patient care due to broken generators, exposed live wires, improper 
wiring connections, leaking roofs, and unsecured disposal of medical waste. 
SIGAR, 2017a 
Kabul 
Kabul Province consists of 32 public health care facilities funded directly by 
USAID. SIGAR reported that “five facilities did not have running water, 
three appeared not to have electricity, and eight may not have adequate or 
consistent power required for proper lighting and to refrigerate some 
pharmaceuticals and vaccines”. 
SIGAR, 2016a 
Kandahar 
An 11-room medical clinic was built in the village of Walayatti to provide 
care to its local population. Inspection teams reported that after construction 
was completed in 2012, the clinic has never been used. SIGAR concluded 
that “almost $200,000 of US taxpayer funds spent to date on the Walayatti 
clinic appears to have been wasted unless the facility is used as intended”. 
SIGAR, 
2013b; 2018d 
Khost 
Twenty visited sites suffered from operational and structural deficiencies: 
lack of reliable electricity, cracked walls, exposed wiring, leaking roofs, 
exposing patients to critical safety concerns. 
SIGAR, 2017e 
Nangarhar 
Four facilities costing $199,244.68 that impacted over 30,000 patients: 
structural deficiencies, leaking roofs, and cracked walls, as well as needing 
additional medical staff to sustain the influx of the patient population 
SIGAR, 2017c 
Parwan 
The Salang Hospital did not provide the medical services that it was 
intended to, reported that the staff only utilized 35% of the square footage of 
the facility employed less than 20% of required staff. Structural deficiencies 
include “lack of electricity, water, furniture, equipment” – with “hospital 
staff was washing newborns with untreated river water”. SIGAR inspection 
team reported that “contractor was paid the full amount of the contract—
more than $500,000”.  
SIGAR, 2016b 
Takhar 
Of the 35 of 66 public health facilities inspected, many did not have reliable 
electricity and water, had broken doors, cracked walls, exposed wiring, and 
leaking roofs. 
SIGAR, 2017b 
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Appendix H 
 
Deficiencies for Projects SIGIR Assessed, by Reconstruction Sector 
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Appendix I 
SIGIR - Obligations and Expenditures of Major US Reconstruction Funds (By Area of Use, as of 
9/30/2012 in $ Billions) 
Area Sector Obligated Expended 
Security and 
Rule of Law 
Ministry of Defense Support 14.41 13.90 
Ministry of Interior Support 9.73 9.35 
Related Activities 1.12 1.08 
Justice 0.77 0.68 
Infrastructure Security 0.67 0.63 
Corrections 0.53 0.46 
Anticorruption 0.07 0.06 
Subtotal 27.30 26.16 
Infrastructure 
Electricity 5.45 5.36 
Water and Sanitation 2.78 2.71 
Oil and Gas 1.76 1.76 
Transportation & Communications 1.31 1.25 
General Infrastructure 0.58 0.58 
Subtotal 11.8 11.66 
Governance 
Public Services 3.06 2.55 
Capacity Development 2.45 2.27 
Democracy & Civil Society 1.91 1.82 
Humanitarian Relief 0.89 0.84 
Subtotal 8.32 7.48 
Economy 
Private Sector Development 0.98 0.87 
Economic Governance 0.84 0.78 
Subtotal 1.82 1.65 
Total 49.23 46.96 
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Appendix J 
 
SIGIR – Major US-funded Healthcare Construction Contracts in $ Millions 
 Completion Date  
Project Province Contractor Name 
Award 
Date 
Original Actual 
US 
Cost 
Primary 
Health 
Care 
Centers 
Many 
Parsons Delaware, 
Inc., Others 
3/25/2004 12/26/2005 10/1/2008 $361.5 
Basrah 
Children’s 
Hospital 
Basrah 
Bechtel National, 
Inc. 
8/3/2004 12/31/2005 10/21/2010 $103.9 
Missan 
Surgical 
Hospital 
Missan 
Eastern Deffaf Al-
Nahraen 
9/20/2007 5/19/2009 N/A $16.0 
Erbil 
Emergency 
Hospital 
Erbil 
Tigris Engineering 
Consultancy 
Electric 
7/28/2008 12/4/2009 5/31/2010 $12.9 
Ba’quba 
General 
Hospital 
Diyala 
Liqaa al-Mustakbal 
Co. 
11/24/2007 12/2/2008 12/26/2010 $8.0 
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Appendix K 
 
Lessons Learned from SIGIR and SIGAR from Reconstruction 
SIGIR SIGAR 
Lessons from Iraq 
1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, 
execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding 
activities during stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. 
2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient 
security, and focus first on small programs and projects. 
3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and 
project selection, securing commitments to share costs 
(possibly through loans) and agreements to sustain 
completed projects after their transfer. 
4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and 
information management systems that all SRO 
[stabilization and reconstruction operations] 
participants use. 
5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the 
operation’s inception. 
6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team program, that 
produced successes when used judiciously. 
7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an 
integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go. 
Lessons from Afghanistan 
1. Successful reconstruction is 
incompatible with continuing 
insecurity. 
2. Unchecked corruption in 
Afghanistan undermined US 
strategic goals—and we helped to 
foster that corruption. 
3. After the Taliban’s initial defeat, 
there was no clear reconstruction 
strategy and no single military 
service, agency, or nation in charge 
of reconstruction. 
4. Politically driven timelines 
undermine the reconstruction effort. 
5. If we cannot end the “annual 
lobotomy,” we should at least 
mitigate its impact. 
6. To be effective, reconstruction 
efforts must be based on a deep 
understanding of the historical, 
social, legal, and political traditions 
of the host nation. 
 
